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I. INTRODUCTION
The electric utility industry, the largest industry in the United
States,1 is in the process of a radical restructuring from a highly
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regulated industry to one driven by a market regime. The impact of
this restructuring will be profound and lasting on every aspect of our
society. As the fourth largest state in the United States, the Florida
Legislature’s approach to the deregulation of the electric utility industry and the emergence of the market regime will be of particular
interest to the rest of the country. At present, particular attention is
directed toward the transformation of control and governance of bulk
transmission facilities, whose crucial role in transmitting electricity
from generating plants to consumers represents the core of the electric utility industry.
Applying the market approach to the electric utility industry is
plausible and has, to an extent, already proven workable.2 Nevertheless, certain technical characteristics unique to the industry challenge the conversion from a regulatory scheme to a purely marketdriven regime. This conversion has been the focus of an impressive
amount of creative energy. In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) supplied the industry’s new foundation by
promulgating two rules, Order 888 and 889,3 both of which sought to
precipitate a shift to a market driven industry. Encouraged by these
rules, the electric utility industry and various government institutions have restructured the industry in many regions of the country.4
Industry participants must formulate a management scheme tailored to the unique institutions that will serve as the cornerstone of
the restructuring process. The emerging industry will have three
separate segments: generation, marketing and distribution, and
transmission. While a market approach to the generation and distribution segments appears feasible,5 applying the same market approach to the transmission segment is problematic because electricity
is an undifferentiated product that cannot be efficiently stored and
cannot be directed from a source of production to any specific enduser. Thus, the overarching task is to structure the transmission
segment of the electric utility industry in a way that does not endan-

1. See TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 5 (1996) (stating that electricity had retail sales of over
$200 billion in 1994).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) [hereinafter Order 888] (codified at
18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385); Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly RealTime Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) [hereinafter Order 889] (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). The Florida Public Service Commission
was an active participant in these rulemaking proceedings. See Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,698.
4. See infra Part II.C.3.
5. See infra Part II.B.
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ger the market solutions at work in the generation and distribution
segments.
The current design of the transmission segment is not directed by
legislation but by the FERC, through its delegated rulemaking authority.6 On May 13, 1999, the FERC issued a rulemaking notice to
accumulate information and comments on what should be the structure of regional transmission organizations.7 The rulemaking notice
attempted to guide both the design of the transmission segment and
its governing institutions. A number of designs have been proposed,
and several systems have been implemented.8 However, many states,
including Florida, are still in various stages of restructuring.9
This Article examines an alternative design for the governance
and decision-making processes of transmission organizations. Part II
of this Article provides a context for the restructuring of the electric
utility industry, including obstacles to a market approach, models for
structuring the industry, the evolution of regulatory policy, and a
discussion of the transmission segment of the industry. Part III provides reasoning and authority for a regional approach to restructuring the transmission segment of the industry. Part IV discusses the
control of transmission organizations and examines the For-Profit
Model and the Not-For-Profit Model. Part V examines the governance of electricity transmission organizations including governance
mechanisms, the regulatory aspects, and the policy-making process.
Part VI provides an examination of the need for individual dispute
resolution in electricity transmission organizations, a discussion of
the FERC’s contribution to ADR in transmission organizations, and a
review of law and policy in an electricity dispute resolution system.
The conclusion provides that the design of electricity transmission
organizations is the keystone of the electric utility industry’s restructuring and that the FERC should mandate a regional approach to
this design.

6. Two key electricity-restructuring bills, however, are before Congress, each of
which includes provisions regarding transmission organizations. See Electric Consumers’
Power to Choose Act of 1999, H.R. 2050, 106th Cong. (1999); The Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act, H.R. 1828, 106th Cong. (1999); The Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act, S. 1047, 106th Cong. (1999).
7. See Regional Transmission Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64
Fed. Reg. 31,390, 87 FERC ¶ 61,173, at 61,684 (1999) [hereinafter RTO NOPR] (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35). One of the regional sessions conducted to formulate this proposed rule
was held in Orlando, and the Florida Public Service Commission along with several Florida utilities participated. See id. at 31,442.
8. See id. at 31,410-11 n.159.
9. See infra Part II.C.3.
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II. CONTEXT
A. Obstacles to a Market Approach for the Electric Utility Industry
Three discrete bodies of law shape the electric utility industry:
physics,10 economics, and society. The laws of physics that govern
electricity are inflexible, leaving economics and society to adapt.
Therein lies the complexity of restructuring the electric utility industry.
Three characteristics of electricity mold the design of the electric
utility industry. First, the product is totally undifferentiated. Second,
the product cannot be economically stored,11 and hence “electricity is
the ultimate perishable commodity.”12 Third, electricity cannot be directed from a source of production to any specific end-user but, instead, must flow towards that user.
The combination of these three characteristics of electricity frustrates implementation of a market approach to the electric utility industry. The complications arising from this combination are aptly illustrated through the following metaphor: envision a person in Spain
buying a cup of water from someone in the United States. The seller
in the United States must deliver the water by dropping it into the
Atlantic Ocean. To receive the delivery, the purchaser in Spain then
dips into the Atlantic Ocean to withdraw the cup of water. The seller
delivered a cup of water into the system and the purchaser withdrew
a cup of water, but in no sense can either party identify the particular molecules of water that were the subject of their market transaction. The transportation of the seller’s cup never literally occurs, and
the cup withdrawn actually comes from an unidentifiable source,
which in all probability is not the seller.
Similarly, a generator plant adds unidentifiable units of electricity
to the flow from which a consumer extracts electricity for personal
use. The generator plant’s agreement to supply the consumer with
electricity can be honored only in the most artificial sense. Adding to
this artificiality is the fiction that a particular unit of electricity is
transported and transmitted directly to the user. In actuality, the
consumed unit may have traveled any number of routes from any
number of sources to the consumer.
The above conceptual problems did not exist in a pre-regulation,
monopolistic electric utility industry in which a vertically-integrated
utility generates, transports, and markets electricity. The consumer
simply contracts with the utility, and the rest of the operation is co10. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antitrust Policy in the New Electricity Industry, 17
ENERGY L.J. 29, 44 (1996).
11. See id.
12. Id.
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ordinated by the utility. But a vertically-integrated electric utility
industry presents serious economic problems. For instance, the utility may, and should if acting responsibly for its owners, behave as a
monopoly that limits the supply of electricity to maintain higher
prices. Thus, a monopolistic, vertically-integrated system produces
less electricity at a higher price than would a free market system, resulting in a social welfare loss. The solution to the monopoly problem
was regulation: allow the electric utility to coordinate the generation,
transmission, and marketing of electricity while remaining under the
command of a regulated and socially optimum management.
The laws of physics that dictate the method of electricity transmission confound replacing the regulatory structure with a free market structure.13 The question remains: How can a market in electricity work when industry participants have so little control over the
delivery of their product? To date, the fiction of a “contract path” has
been used to solve the dilemma.14 In the contract path fiction, a particular generator agrees to sell a quantity of electricity to its consumers. The consumers are under the impression that they are receiving
units of electricity directly from the generator. Therefore, the fiction
allows market-like transactions to take place. In reality, the electricity of a particular generator plant is combined with the flow of electricity produced by numerous generator plants, and the consumer extracts electricity from this flow of undifferentiated units.
Not only do consumers never actually receive the contracted-for
units from the specific generator, but, of course, the transportation of
those contracted-for units never actually takes place. The generator
produces electricity that is added to a flow of undifferentiated units
of electricity and the end-user draws from that flow. The costs of the
transmission facilities and services must be included in the agreement and borne by the parties. Transmission charges may be set
through a second fiction in which the contracted-for units are seen as
actually traveling over the wires from the generator to the end-user.
In addition to the laws of physics obstacle, an economic obstacle
exists that further hampers the adoption of a market regime. For
decades, the assumption was made that the electric utility industry
as a whole was a natural monopoly and that large firms were the
most efficient form of organization, with regulation only attempting
to temper economic abuse of their dominant positions.15 The unas13. See id.
14. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,424.
15. “In a world in which competition is ideal, . . . there is a natural monopoly in a particular market if and only if a single firm can produce the desired output at lower cost than
any combination of two or more firms.” WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY 54 (1982). A “natural monopoly” exists where a firm’s average costs continue to
fall within any feasible range of production and hence one producer can satisfy total demand requirements at the lowest cost. JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE
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sailable conclusion remains that, while operation and distribution
are not inherently monoplies, bulk transmission operates most efficiently, indeed inevitably, as a monopoly. This transmission monopoly between the two competitive segments threatens the market approach. In sum, the restructuring of the electric utility industry from
a regulated monopoly to a free market system will require an organizational breakthrough in the design of transmission organizations
that thwarts the tendency toward monopoly.
B. A More Realistic View of Electricity in a Market-Driven Electric
Utility Industry
Redesigning transmission organizations must begin with accepting the limitations inherent in electricity due to the laws of physics
and economics. First, the fiction of bundles of contracted-for electricity leaving the generator plant for transport to the consumers must
be banished. Second, a new conceptualization of electricity must be
adopted in which a generator plant sells its electricity into the flow,
and the consumers purchase electricity from this flow. The new design of transmission organizations must simply ensure that electricity flows from the generator plants to the consumers.
The laws of physics are inherent in the existing structure of
transmission organizations. Every transmission organization has a
system operator, an entity that makes decisions concerning the flow
of electricity, or dispatch, which directs the flow of electricity. The
system operator is a technical operation within the structure of the
utility. Thus, system operators exist as the natural control centers
for electricity transmission. Restructuring transmission systems entails redesigning the existing structure so that transmission may become part of a market-driven electric utility industry.
In economic terms, a market-driven electric utility industry faces
two pricing problems: (1) coordinating the supply and demand for
electricity, and (2) setting a price for transmission so that resulting
loads, the electricity being transmitted, equals capacity, the amount
of electricity that can flow through the bulk transmission wires. Any
form of restructuring must produce a market-clearing price for electricity whereby the supply matches the demand at a level that can be
accommodated by the transmission organization. Since electricity enTHEORY AND APPLICATIONS 241-42 (6th ed. 1998). Observations regarding “subadditivity”
suggest that the discovery of the social advantage from monopoly and perhaps regulation
is more complicated than just declining costs. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE vi (1982) (“One of the fundamental
insights on which this book is based is the finding that it is subadditivity of costs, and not
scale economies, that determines when society can be served more economically by a monopoly firm.”). Beyond cautioning that one firm might produce at lower cost not linked to
scale economies, applying subadditivity is a daunting empirical enterprise. See id. at 17072.
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ters and exits these transmission organizations, the managers of
those facilities will be key players in instituting market reforms. The
efficient solution to the second problem places the transmission organizations in a bottleneck position. Without a pricing system that
constrains the monopolistic tendencies of the transmission organizations, market-driven changes in the organizations will not be successful.
C. Evolution of Regulatory Policy
The regulation of the electric utility industry was due in part to
the acceptance that the industry is a “natural monopoly.”16 Regulation of the industry was intended to capture the economic benefits
from the economies of scale inherent in large, integrated electric
utilities, but compelling the utilities to perform as if ruled by market
forces. Recently, deep-seated economic and social forces have moved
the focus from regulatory policy to market-driven approaches.17
1. Growing Skepticism about Regulation
The governmental regulation of the electric utility industry, while
not without criticism,18 appeared unassailable until the late 1960s.
Theoretical challenges to governmental regulation could not compete
with the fact that the real price of electricity declined steadily over
the same period.19 However, the decline in prices was primarily due
to technological advances rather than to the efficiency of regulation.20

16. See generally RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCOTT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE
HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER ELECTRICITY (1986) (tracing the history of how the conflict between public and private interests has shaped the electric utility industry).
17. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1383 (1998):
We will consider four economic and social explanations for recent regulatory
changes, arranged in order of increasing generality: (1) that the great transformation has been caused by technological changes; (2) that it has been caused
by a series of chain reactions brought about by the introduction of competition
in one industry which has destabilized the status quo in another industry; (3)
that it is the product of interest group politics; and (4) that it reflects an ideological consensus among policy elites that the risks of regulatory failure associated with the original paradigm are greater than the risks of market failure associated with competition.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
19. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and
Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339,
1344 (1993) (citing Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974)).
20. “On the contrary, retrospective studies have produced considerable evidence that
cost-of-service regulation failed at its basic task of limiting utilities to a normal return on
invested capital.” Id. (citing Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974));
see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72
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Still consumers were delighted to have cheap, readily available electricity. Governmental regulation of the industry, while viewed as a
second-best solution, was considered far superior to a free-market
system in which the utilities’ dominant position would prevent any
form of regulation by market forces.21
In the 1970s, developments in engineering, economics, and law
threatened the stability of the government’s electric utility regulation. First, utilities began to exhaust economies of scale in the generation segment, and the generation segment no longer resembled a
natural monopoly.22 At the same time, the transmission segment became more efficient, and power could be transmitted as far as 1,000
miles from the point of generation.23 Due to this increased transmission range, the electricity market became regional rather than local.24
Second, electricity rates paid by consumers began to increase in real
terms due to rising fuel and environmental cost.25 Third, the United
States Supreme Court decided Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,26 in which the Court recognized that at least some segments
of the electric utility industry could be competitive with one another
and, thus, subject to antitrust laws.27 The decision in Otter Tail, in
concert with the publicity surrounding the decision in United States
v. American Telephone & Telegraph,28 which opened telecommunications to competition, shook the legal foundations of the regulatory regime.29
Key to the evolution of regulatory policy is the electric utility industry’s commitment to substantial growth. Two forces caused this
commitment. First, traditional rate regulation led utilities to make
excessive investments in increasing their “rate base.”30 A large rate
base for a utility is advantageous because rates were computed to recover regulatory costs and generate some profits, or “rate of return.”31
Thus, utilities that could convince government regulators to permit
an above-normal return on capital had a financial incentive to overVA. L. REV. 1183, 1183-1208 (1986); George Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?: The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON 1 (1962).
21. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS (1970) (evincing an emerging skepticism that was to be instrumental in the
deregulation movement).
22. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE
COMPETITIVE ERA 14 (1997).
26. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
27. See id. at 374-75 (holding that antitrust laws can be applied to electric utilities).
28. 522 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
29. See id. (leading to the breakup of AT&T and opening telecommunications to
competition).
30. Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1344-45.
31. Id.
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invest in capital assets, which is termed the “Averch-Johnson effect.”32 Second, federal agency recommendations projected a significant increase in the demand for electricity that led regulators to encourage utilities to engage in substantial expansion.33 Yet in the
1980s, demand for electricity flattened, due to price increases and the
popular call for conservation.34 Utility managers lost their financial
glitter as government regulators restricted utilities’ attempts to recover their investment in capital assets through higher rates to the
consumers.35 Thus, the utilities began to seek relief from the governmental regulatory regime, which restricted their profit margins.
2. Federal Policy Development
In 1935, the Federal Power Act was amended to give the recently
created Federal Power Commission (FPC) authority over all wholesale distribution of electricity.36 When the Department of Energy was
created in 1977, FPC was reconstituted as the FERC.37 The FERC,
like the FPC, has the power to regulate rates charged by electric
utilities and to supervise the general performance of the electric utility industry. Regulatory authority over the electric utility industry is
divided between the FERC and state regulatory authorities, which
are known by a variety of names including public utility commissions
(PUC) and public service commissions (PSC).38 Congress assigned the
FERC authority over the wholesale, bulk segment of the industry,
and states had authority over the industry’s non-interstate and retail
segments.39
The FERC, with the support of Congress, began considering a
comprehensive restructuring of the rules governing the electric utility industry.40 On April 24, 1996, the FERC issued Orders 888 and
32. Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
33. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345-46.
34. See id. at 1346.
35. See id.
36. In 1920, Congress created the Federal Power Commission in the Federal Power
Act, Part I and gave the Commission power over hydroelectric projects. See 16 U.S.C. §§
791-823 (1999). The Federal Power Act, Part II gave the FPC power over wholesale electric
power. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (a)-(m) (1999).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(1)(B), 7293 (1994).
38. This article uses the term “PSC” to refer to state regulatory authorities in general
because Florida has chosen that term.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1994).
40. The National Energy Act of 1978 produced a compendium of laws aimed at restructuring the entire United States energy industry, with several features directed specifically at electric utilities. More significant was the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA). PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.). PURPA encouraged, but did not require, rate reform
and, most significantly, attempted to advantage certain types of independent generators,
or “qualifying facilities.” See id. (Utilities were required to purchase their power at a price
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889.41 Order 888 sought to precipitate a shift to a market-driven industry primarily by compelling open access to the transmission
“grid,” the web of interconnected bulk power wires.42 Order 889 attempted to establish transparent pricing of electricity by compelling
electronic posting of prices and availability through creating a computer network of electricity market information known as “Open Access Same-Time Information System” (OASIS).43 While Order 889’s
pricing transparency was necessary for the emergence of the competitive electric utility industry, Order 888’s open access initiative
supplied the general foundation upon which restructuring would be
built.44 The strategy behind Order 888 was to describe goals and allow the utilities, with PSC coordination, to design a new marketdriven industry.45
3. State Developments
State electric utility deregulation has proceeded at an uneven
pace, with high-cost electricity states, such as California, New
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, moving quickly to deregulate, and
low-cost states like Kansas, Nebraska, and Kentucky enacting few, if
any, changes to their regulatory schemes.46 Despite the uneven pace,
the trend in all states, as in the federal regulatory system, is toward
less regulation and more competition in the electric utility industry.47
Electric utility deregulation is a contentious political issue in most
states.48 While most deregulation orders were issued through legislathat did not exceed the “avoided costs,” the cost they would have incurred by building new
plants.). The crucial legislative step was the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). EPAct,
Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified, among other places, at 15 U.S.C. §
79z-5a (1997), and 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(22-25), 824j (1985)). There, Congress required the
FERC to force utilities to deliver power from generators to other utilities and electricity
wholesalers at reasonable, nondiscriminatory, cost-based rates. See id. This legislative
mandate led the FERC to issue its open access rule, Order 888.
41. See Order 888, supra note 3; Order 889, supra note 3.
42. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552.
43. Order 889, supra note 3, at 21,737.
44. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,541.
45. See id. at 21,542.
46. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Status of State Electricity Restructuring Activity as of March 2000 (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/tab5rev.html>.
47. See id.
48. The greatest challenge to deregulation may be the issue of stranded costs. Deregulation would make many utilities’ past investments economically unviable. The costs of
these commitments, or “stranded cost,” could amount to between 10 and 200 billion dollars.
See BRENNAN, supra note 1, at 96. Who will bear these costs is controversial. Order 888
guarantees utilities may “recover their legitimate, prudent and verifiable stranded costs.”
Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,628. Stranded cost recovery is standard in deregulation
bills. Still, in both California and Massachusetts, ballot initiatives were proposed that
would limit the recovery of stranded costs. See California Proposition 9 (1998); Massachusetts Question 4: Referendum on an Existing Law (1998) (last modified Jan. 29, 2000)
<http://www.state.ma.us/sec/ele/elebq98/bq98qst4.htm> (limiting the recovery of stranded
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tion, some state PSCs have been primarily responsible for state deregulation.49 In fact, some legislatures have passed bills instructing
their PSCs to instigate the deregulation of the electric utility industry.50 However, when PSCs have attempted to instigate deregulation
without a delegation of authority from their legislatures, such as in
New Mexico and Michigan,51 state supreme courts have struck down
PSC deregulation orders.52
Electricity rates vary substantially throughout the country, which
leads to different concerns regarding deregulation in different regions. States with higher-than average rates are most anxious to experiment with deregulation while ratepayers in low-rate states worry
that regionalization will lead their utilities to seek more profitable
markets and subsequently increase their rates.53 Florida was among
those states that advised the FERC that the above concerns should
not be allowed to impede state deregulation.54
D. Focus on the Transmission Segment of the Industry
At present, reforms of the regulatory policy for the electric utility
industry are comprehensive and attempt to restructure the industry
as a holistic unit. The several schemes now in place are building a
useful foundation for creating a wholly market-driven industry.55
However, as discussed above, the transmission segment of the industry resists market alternatives for reasons based in both the physical
characteristics of electricity as a product and the economic realities
of transmitting electric current through bulk transmission systems.56
Thus, special attention must be placed on the transmission segment
for the entire industry to emerge as market-driven.
1. Emergence of the ISO Solution
The dominant approach to restructuring the transmission segment of the electric utility industry revolves around the development
of independent transmission system operators (ISOs). Many experts
urge that the best method for ensuring nondiscriminatory transmission of electricity is to place management, if not ownership and opcosts would have required a no vote to the ballot question, which asked whether voters approved of the state’s electric utility restructuring act passed the previous year).
49. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 46.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Sandel v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm’n, 980 P.2d 55, 64 (N.M. 1999).
53. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 46.
54. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,412.
55. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Evolving Regulatory Reform: The
Federal and State Role in Promoting Competition (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/chapter7.html>.
56. See supra Part II.A.1.
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eration, in the hands of an independent entity.57 If the management
function can be segregated from the business of transmission, the independent management could operate the grid to facilitate the emergence of a market-driven regime without the contamination inherent
in being a market participant.58
An ISO has two complementary roles: (1) “daily operation” of a
specified transmission grid, the scope of which can be controversial,
and (2) implementation of a “bidding system that would determine
which generators provide power to the grid” at any given price and
“point in time.”59 The ISO would “use existing algorithms that reflect
the characteristics of the grid, including the capacity constraints and
network interactions that exist in varying generation and load conditions.”60 These capacity or congestion constraints define the value of
the transmission operation, and the ISO would optimize transmission capacity so that the least costly electricity flows to the consumers who value it the most.61
The ISO, alone or coordinated with another entity, would engage
in this complicated operation in addition to the technical operation of
managing the flow of electricity. The ISO would either run or be affiliated with a “power exchange.”62 For each half hour, “each purchaser would submit a bid that consists of the quantity of electricity”
the purchaser desires at any particular price, and each generator
plant “would submit a bid that consists of the quantity of electricity”
that the plant “is willing to sell” at any given price; thus, the prices
for each bid may vary for different delivery points and extraction
points, often referred to as “nodes.”63 The ISO “would then input the
bids and run the algorithm.”64 The output from the algorithm would
include (1) “the quantity of electricity that flows in and out of the
grid at each node during that half hour;” (2) “the price paid and received at each node;” and (3) “the per unit cost of transmission on
each path.”65 The ISO “would automatically implement an efficient
transmission pricing policy” because the “marginal cost of transmission from one node to any other node would be the difference between
the time-specific prices of electricity at the two nodes.”66

57. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,595-97.
58. See id. at 21,596.
59. Pierce, supra note 10, at 40 (discussing the “Poolco” model).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Andrew Noceto et al., Public Utilities Commission, 16 CA. REG. L. REP. 158, 159
(1999) (specifically examining the experiences of the California Public Utilities Commission).
63. Pierce, supra note 10, at 40.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Both state and regional restructuring of the electric utility industry have incorporated versions of the ISO.67 While these restructuring efforts that employ ISOs incorporate practical design elements,
they are based on theoretical models.68 Many states have chosen to
install various forms of transmission organizations that include
ISOs, Power Exchanges (PXs), or organizations that combine functions of both.69 The Desert Southwest Transmission and Reliability
Operator (Desert STAR) presents an interesting new design that requires further examination. The Desert STAR is an Independent
Scheduling Administrator (ISA), also known as an “ISO lite.”70 Ohio
is one of a few states with two competing ISOs, the Alliance71 and the
Midwest ISO.72
Given the variety of options, the kind of transmission organizations states will implement is unclear. Moreover, how many states
will have transmission organizations designated by state, such as
California, remains unclear.73 Most ISOs seem to be regional, such as
the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection, Alliance
ISO, and Midwest ISO.74 The trend is toward regional transmission
organizations, and the FERC is promoting that option.75 Still, the
Florida’s PSC has urged the FERC not to impose a one-size-fits-all
approach to transmission organization design.76 The FERC appears
inclined to follow the Florida PSC’s advice, and Florida will soon
need to give its attention to developing its own transmission organization design.
A number of countries adopted some form of the ISO when they
restructured their electric utility industries, including Great Britain,
67. For a valuable and comprehensive exploration of the governance of four power
pools outside the United States, see James Barker et al., Regulation of Power Pools and
System Operators: An International Comparison, 18 ENERGY L.J. 261 (1997).
68. See J.P. Pfeifenberger et al., In What Shape is Your ISO?, ELECTRICITY J., July
1998, at 80-81.
69. See Robert J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 ENERGY
L.J. 233, 246-249 (1999).
70. K.R. Saline & Associates, Desert STAR Update (May-June 1998) (visited June 21,
1999) <http://www.swrta.org/desert.html>. The Desert STAR appears to represent Arizona,
New Mexico, Texas, and Las Vegas. See id.
71. The Alliance ISO includes American Electric Power, Consumers Energy, Detroit
Edison, First Energy Corp., and the Virginia Electric and Power Company, and First Energy Corp. (Ohio). See generally U.S. Energy Information Administration, Summary Information on Approved and Planned Independent System Operators as of March 31, 1998
(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_issu/chg_iss_rpt/
table15.html> (table presenting information on approved and planned ISOs).
72. The Midwest ISO includes Ohio companies Cinergy, Commonwealth Edison, Illinois Power, CILCO, and Louisville Gas and Electric. Midwest ISO serves Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See infra Part II.D.2.
76. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,411.
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Norway, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile.77 Most relevant to the
United States is the design of Canadian systems.78 Ontario, which is
connected with Michigan, New York, and Minnesota, designed its
transmission system around an independent “grid company.”79 Alberta, which is connected with the Northwest, has already restructured its electricity market by creating a grid company, “Alberta
Gridco,” that administers a single transmission facility.80 Under the
Alberta Gridco structure, transmission-owning utilities have no control over the rates and conditions that are governed by the provincial
utility board.81
2.

FERC Explores Transmission Organization Options

The ISO serves as the fulcrum upon which a market regime can
be established for the electric utility industry. Order 888 did not focus on the special problems of restructuring the transmission segment of the industry, but Order 888 does encourage ISOs.82 While not
mandating the use of ISOs, Order 888 suggests that a restructuring
proposal be facilitated through the FERC’s regulatory machinery if
authority over transmission was delegated to some form of ISO.83
While Order 888 did not prescribe a particular form for the management function of electric utilities, it did provide eleven principles that
provide guidance.84

77. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 40.
78. The FERC’s open access regulation has been resisted by some Canadian utilities.
See Mary K. Strahan, Comment: Connecting Currents: Toward the Integration of North
American Electricity Markets, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 291, 311 (1999).
79. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION IN ONTARIO’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM, A
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION: THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
COMPETITION IN ONTARIO’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM TO THE ONTARIO MINISTER OF
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY 53 (1996).
80. TransAlta Enterprises Corp., 75 FERC ¶ 61,268, at 61,875 (1996).
81. See id.
82. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,565.
83. See id. at 21,595.
84. See id. at 21,595-97. Briefly those principles are:
1.
Fair and non-discriminatory governance
2.
no conflicts of interest
3.
“[a] single, unbundled, grid-wide tariff [rates and other conditions]
that applies to all eligible users in a non-discriminatory manner;"
4.
responsibility for assuring reliability
5.
control over interconnection
6.
promote efficient trading of electricity
7.
establish incentives for efficient management
8.
non-discriminatory provision of ancillary services
9.
assure that information is publicly available
10.
coordinate among grids; and
11.
establish alternative dispute resolution processes.
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The FERC recognized the need to move transmission development
from the “traditional means of grid management” to a second stage in
which information about ISOs’ actual operation will emerge and certain crucial issues, previously bypassed, will be confronted.85 To
achieve this goal, the FERC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NOPR) regarding transmission organizations.86 The NOPR stated:
Our objective is for all transmission owning entities in the Nation,
including non-public utility entities, to place their transmission
facilities under the control of appropriate regional transmission institutions in a timely manner. We seek to accomplish our objective
by encouraging voluntary participation. We are therefore proposing in this rulemaking minimum characteristics and functions for
appropriate regional transmission institutions; a collaborative process by which public utilities and non-public utilities that own, operate or control interstate transmission facilities, in consultation
with the state officials as appropriate, will consider and develop
regional transmission institutions; a willingness to consider incentive pricing on a case-specific basis and an offer of non-monetary
regulatory benefits, such as deference in dispute resolution, reduced or eliminated codes of conduct, and streamlined filing and
approval procedures; and a time line for public utilities to make
appropriate filings with the Commission and initiate operation of
regional transmission institutions. As a result, we expect jurisdictional utilities to form Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs).87

These objectives raise a deceptively contentious list of issues, not
the least of which is the encouragement of “Regional Transmission
Organizations,”88 which implies that the transmission systems will
operate on a regional basis rather than a state basis. The recommendation of using Regional Transmission Organizations portends a
power struggle between the FERC and state regulators that may also
involve state legislatures.
Equally controversial is the NOPR’s apparent indifference to
“transcos,” which are private systems operators and not-for-profit
ISOs. Because systems managers will be able to capture or distribute
substantial benefits from their dominant position, many academics
and regulators fear delegating the power to control transmission organizations to a commercial entity and, hence, advocate the commercial independence of not-for-profit ISOs.89 Others have faith that pri-

85. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391.
86. See id. at 31,390.
87. Id. at 31,391.
88. Id.
89. See William L. Massey, Policy on Regional Transmission Organizations: Five Pitfalls FERC Must Avoid, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, at 18-19.
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vate ownership will offer the most efficient and reliable transmission
services.90
Although immediate attention will be given to the regional and
commercial aspects of the transmission organization, the governance
and process alternatives will also be crucial to the ultimate success of
any redesign of the transmission organization. Such issues as stakeholder governance, participation in policymaking, processes for setting standards, and individual dispute resolution procedures must be
resolved in any transmission organization design.
III. REGIONAL APPROACH
The FERC’s regional transmission organization NOPR, while continuing the theme of voluntary participation from Order 888, boldly
states: “we expect jurisdictional utilities to form Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).” 91 The FERC’s expectation of regional
transmission organizations (RTOs) creates conflict between the traditional roles of the FERC and state regulators. The FERC’s current
delegation of authority, as it has been historically interpreted, limits
the FERC’s authority to the interstate and wholesale segments of the
electric utility industry, while states traditionally have had authority
over the retail delivery function of the industry.92 A shift to RTOs
compromises both the FERC’s and the state regulator’s traditional
realms of authority.
The transmission system was partitioned along state lines to take
advantage of state regulation.93 Today, technology permits high voltage current to be efficiently transmitted up to 1,000 miles from the
point of generation, and the transmission lines are interconnected to
form a national grid for electrical power.94 The interconnection of
transmission lines was created so that various systems could support
each other, but this goal has been hindered by the very limited capacity of transmission lines.95 Despite the limited capacity of transmission lines, the electricity market has been regional not local.96
At present, both state and regional transmission organizations exist or are being developed. State-centered operating transmission organizations exist in California and Texas, and the FERC has condi-

90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 19.
RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1994).
See STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 91 (Brookings Inst. ed. 1974); Public Util. Comm’n of Rhode
Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electricity Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927) (electricity sold across
state lines was held to be interstate commerce and under federal jurisdiction).
94. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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tionally approved one in New York.97 Additionally, Arizona and Nevada have begun the process for approval of state-centered transmission organizations.98 In contrast, several RTOs are in operation or in
various stages of development.99 Therefore, the FERC should instigate a debate over the optimum geographic configuration for transmission organizations.100 The FERC’s tardiness in facilitating this
debate will likely be blamed for the high cost incurred from the delay
in implementing RTOs.101
A. Reasons for a Regional Approach
The FERC presumes that regional organizations are superior, and
the FERC’s NOPR listed five major benefits of RTOs, each benefit
with several substantial subpoints.102 These benefits of RTOs support
three arguments: (1) regional organization offers the most efficient
market; (2) regional organization enables self-regulation in which
government regulators withdraw to a position of monitoring the private regulation; and (3) regional organization enhances the growth
and reliability of the electricity market.103 Reconfiguring the industry
into a few large, RTOs will create an efficient market.104 As explained
above, electricity does not actually flow from the generator plant to
the purchaser of that generator plant’s production; rather the generator plants add their electricity into the flow, and the purchaser
draws electricity from the flow.105
Resulting from the fiction of the contract flow, that the consumed
electricity is the same as the electricity for which the consumer contracts, any price for transmission is artificial. Due to the contract
path, transmission charges have been based on the distance the electricity travels from the assigned source.106 A large RTO makes realistic transmission charges possible, and the total charges can reflect
operating costs, including salaries to employees and managers, investment returns, and incentives.107 The RTO facilitates uniform
charges so all RTO customers cover their share of the costs of opera-

97. See Massey, supra note 89, at 15.
98. See id.
99. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 71.
100. The Commission acknowledges that it has recognized the benefits of regional
organization for some time. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407.
101. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Why FERC Must Mandate Efficiently Structured Regional ISOs-Now!, ELECTRICITY J., Jan. 1999, at 54.
102. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407-11.
103. See id.
104. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 51.
105. See supra Part II.A.
106. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50.
107. See id. at 50-52. See generally RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407-11 (discussing
the benefits of RTOs).
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tion and transmission.108 The unified operation can figure the capacity of the entire system and allocate capacity to avoid congestion.109
This system encourages charges to represent actual costs, cuts
transaction costs, and encourages necessary investment. A unified
pricing system encourages competition by creating trust in the system.110 In sum, the major market advantage of the RTO is that it creates uniform and tradable units of electricity.111 Natural forces, without the artificiality of government ratemaking, will therefore set
rates.112
A major obstacle to competition is entrenched opportunities for
former utilities to maintain their dominance through a system of affiliates. Hence RTOs, especially if commercially independent as discussed below, must make objective decisions and, perhaps more importantly, must be perceived by stakeholders as making objective decisions.113 Due to this objective decision-making, many regulatorytype decisions can be left in the RTOs’ hands. Administering a
transmission system requires extremely high performance standards,
and industry members are in a better position to set those standards
than federal or state regulators.114 The RTO can make uniform standards for a large portion of the electric utility industry. The FERC
anticipates that its direct regulatory duties will diminish with the
development of RTOs. Similarly, the FERC perceives that a trusted
RTO will provide individual dispute resolution services without involving the federal government. 115 Thus, the FERC’s role will shift to
monitoring the performance of the self-regulatory RTO much like the
relationship among the SEC and the large securities exchanges.
The trust between RTOs and stakeholders will also enhance the
growth and reliability of RTOs. Investors in RTOs will know that
their investment will not be compromised by discriminatory selfdealing by insiders.116 Reliability will also be increased by RTOs superiority in planning for future needs and meeting those needs due to
the more comprehensive view the RTO is positioned to take.117
B. Authority for Mandating a Regional Approach
Nonetheless, the RTO presents a tremendous source of tension as
evidenced in the FERC’s consultation with the states that unsurpris108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50-52.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part III.B.
See Pierce, supra note 101, 49-50.
See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,410.
See Massey, supra note 89, at 15.
See id.
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ingly revealed substantial opposition to RTOs.118 The creation of
RTOs intrudes upon traditional areas of state power and wellentrenched state regulatory authorities. Moreover, opposition came
from the existing electric utilities. They have traditionally exercised
substantial influence over state regulators, and may not be able to
wield the same influence over RTOs where the utilities’ interest will
compete with those of consumers and independent generator plants,
as well as with other RTO owners.119
The FERC, in the NOPR, sought cooperation from the states in
shifting to a national system of a few RTOs.120 Indeed, the only way
for a market-driven electric utility industry to be successful is for the
FERC to design a system of RTOs. Therefore, the FERC should be
assertive in exercising its authority to design such a system. The two
recent major restructuring bills grant the FERC authority to create
RTOs in recognition of the need for the FERC’s leadership on this issue.121
Even without the recent bills, the FERC’s authority to design a
system of RTOs under existing legislation is undisputed. The FERC
timidly asserts its authority to mandate RTOs, citing particularly its
authority under Section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA).122
Section 202(a) of the FPA states that “the Commission is empowered
and directed to divide the country into regional districts . . . .”123 A
superficial ambiguity is created by the phrase “for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities.”124 However, the voluntariness refers to the coordination in the RTO and not to the power of
the FERC to create such authorities.125
Key to deriving the FERC’s authority to design a system of RTOs
from section 202(a) is the section’s explicit delegation of authority to
make policy. The final command of section 202(a) delegates to the
FERC the responsibility to make decisions regarding electric utility
policy and to implement these decisions. Section 202(a) sets the goal
of “assuring an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the
United States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to
the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources.”126 Sec-

118. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,411 (“Most states oppose a FERC mandate to
form RTOs.”).
119. See id. at 31,390.
120. See id. at 31,391.
121. See H.R. 1828, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1047, 106th Cong. (1999); Electric Consumers’ Power to Choose Act of 1999, H.R. 2050, 106th Cong.
122. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 824a. (a) (1994).
124. Id.
125. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 55.
126. 16 U.S.C. § 824a. (a) (1994).
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tion 202(a), thus, provides ample authority to support the conclusion
that the nation’s transmission system must operate through RTOs.127
A long and well-established principle of administrative law extends great deference to an agency charged with policymaking responsibility.128 This long-standing principle was confirmed in the
celebrated opinion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.129 When challenging an agency’s construction of a
statutory provision involving its own duties, Justice Stevens concluded the agency interpretation must prevail where the question
“really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress.”130 Such policymaking discretion has long been recognized under the FPA.131 Applying the conclusions of Justice Stevens and the
recognition of discretion from the FPA, the FERC’s implementation
of a policy that favors RTOs would be within the FERC’s policymaking responsibility and a reasonable exercise of the FERC’s authority.
However, a bold assertion of the FERC’s authority may be tempered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent inclination to protect state
sovereignty.132 The Court’s strongest protection of state sovereignty
occurred in Printz v. United States133 in which county sheriffs sought
to enjoin enforcement of the provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that imposed enforcement responsibilities on
the county sheriffs.134 The Court’s commitment to protecting state
sovereignty is poignantly illustrated by the following statement: “It is
the very principal of separate state sovereignty that such a law of-

127. Section 210, granting the FERC authority over interconnection, supplements its
authority under section 202(a). Section 210 expands its authority to require new interconnections, see 16 U.S.C. § 824i. (a)(1)(A), and authorizes “such action as may be necessary to
make effective any physical connection . . . [that] is ineffective for any reason.” 16 U.S.C. §
824i. (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
128. See generally 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, §
12.31 (2d. ed. 1997) (discussing policymaking as the “zenith” of administrative authority).
129. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
130. Id. at 866.
131. Deference to the FERC’s policymaking discretion, from the FPC, was established
in the classic statement of Judge Leventhal: “[W]e observe that the breadth of agency discretion is, if anything, at zenith when the action assailed relates primarily . . . to the fashioning of policies . . . .” Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d
153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Although an intermediate appellate court opinion, Judge Leventhal’s statement became one of the most venerated expressions of this principle.
132. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that states may not be
sued in their own courts by state employees for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2202 (1999) (holding that states
are immune from patent infringement suits); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 119
S.Ct. 2219, 2220 (1999) (holding that states are immune from trademark suits).
133. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
134. See id. at 901.

2000]

TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS

589

fends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect.”135
Still, control over the transmission of electricity is not an inherent
component of state sovereignty. The Court in Printz expressly distinguished a case, FERC v. Mississippi,136 involving a similar state sovereignty challenge to the FERC’s exercising regulatory authority
over the states.137 In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court “upheld the
statutory provision at issue precisely because . . . [it] merely imposed
preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise preempted field.”138 In reviewing the regulatory actions of the FERC’s
predecessor, the FPC, the Court found, in the Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases,139 that the FPC “must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise
methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and
conflicting interests.”140
Traditionally, the electric utility industry and, specifically, the
transmission segment of the industry have been considered interstate commerce, and as a consequence, the state’s regulatory authority over the industry derives purely from congressional delegation.141
If the FERC chooses to exercise its authority over wholesale transmission in a manner that diminishes state regulatory authority, the
states’ challenge to the FERC’s actions cannot be based on the principle of state sovereignty.142 In fact, if the FERC finds with adequate
support that RTOs are preferable to an individualized state system, a
reviewing court would overstep its authority by second-guessing a
policy choice that is within the FERC’s discretion and based on its
expertise.

135. Id. at 932.
136. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
137. See 521 U.S. at 929 (distinguishing FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62).
138. 456 U.S. at 761-62.
139. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
140. Id. at 767.
141. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 a. (a) (1994).
142. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit accepted the argument that the FERC
regulation that indirectly affects state jurisdiction is unauthorized. See Northern States
Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090, 1096 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he indirect effect of Order No.
888 . . . has transgressed its Congressional authority which limits its jurisdiction to interstate transactions.”). The FERC, however, is correct that national regulation will often
necessarily indirectly affect state options and, hence, that effect alone cannot be allowed to
interfere with the exercise of the FERC interstate authority. The Eighth Circuit also
impermissibly substituted its policy judgment. If found best for the national electricity
grid, mandated regionalization of bulk transmission operation will be within the FERC’s
delegated authority no matter how it affects state authority over retail operations.
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IV. CONTROL OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION
All transmission organization proposals are based on the theme of
independence that arises in three distinct ways. First, the whole deregulation and restructuring effort is motivated by the desire to be
independent from state and federal government regulators.143 Second, many transmission organization proposals offer designs that are
independent from the pitfalls of commercial allures such as discrimination and self-dealing.144 In fact, the FERC’s list of minimum characteristics provides that “The RTO Must be Independent of Market
Participants.”145 Third, other proposals offer a transmission organization that is independent from the other segments of the electric utility industry.146 In deciding which transmission organization design is
best, all three independence concerns must be evaluated.
As discussed above, the dominant vision for the design of the
transmission organization revolves around an independent authority
that is insulated from commercial forces.147 As more proposals are
put forward, some designers are now suggesting that the transmission organization, as well as the generation and distribution/marketing segments, could be structured as a for-profit entity.
Since the nomenclature for these models are still unsettled, “transco”
will designate a for-profit transmission organization model, and ISO
(independent system operator) will designate a not-for-profit model.
Both models are explicated and evaluated below.
A. Transco: The For-Profit Transmission Organization Model
1. The Transco Concept
Prior to restructuring, transmission grids were owned and managed by private utilities, referred to as investor-owned utilities
(IOUs), that provided the transmission facilities and the ancillary
services necessary to transmit electricity.148 IOUs are vertically143. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Factors Underlying the Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/chapter5.html>.
144. See Massey, supra note 89, at 15.
145. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414.
146. See Massey, supra note 89, at 14.
147. See RTO NOPR, supra note 6, at 31,414.
148. Ancillary services or interconnection operation services are necessary to support
the transmission operation. The FERC proposed six ancillary services: “(1) scheduling and
dispatching services, (2) load following service, (3) energy imbalance service, (4) system
protection service, (5) reactive power/voltage control service, and (6) loss compensation service.” Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,579. One commentator observed: “Discussions of specific ISOs can be confusing at this stage because the range of services that grid operators
provide or manage can be disaggregated or decomposed in different ways, depending in
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integrated business entities that owned not only the transmission
segments of the electric utility industry, but also the generation and
marketing/distribution segments.149 IOUs provided capital, made decisions about investment, and took risks for future development, and
thereby assured the reliability of the system.150 IOUs generally did a
complicated job well.
Restructuring of the industry requires a fundamental decision:
should the vertically-integrated IOUs divest themselves of the generation and marketing/distribution segments. The FERC, in Order
888, concluded that “functional unbundling” would be sufficient.151
Functional unbundling requires that the utilities separate the different segments of their operation, make interaction among the segments open to the public, and open transmission access to competitors of the utilities’ former affiliates.152
The transco structure would transfer the transmission operation
over to a for-profit firm that would both own and operate the transmission organization.153 The transco structure would differ from the
ISO in that the for-profit firm would own, operate, and manage the
transmission facilities.154 Whereas an ISO would independently
manage the transmission wires without interference from commercial interests, the transco would manage and operate transmission
wires for profit while remaining structurally independent from the
generator plants and marketers/distributors.155 The transco conforms
to functional unbundling but allows the utilities to continue to own
the wires and compete in other segments of the industry through affiliates.156
Transco proponents urge that the profit motive will lead to an efficient management of the transmission wires.157 Further, transco proponents doubt that not-for-profit ISO managers will operate under
part on the overall structure of the [future transmission organization].” FOX-PENNER, supra note 25, at 202.
149. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Generation Components (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
chg_str/chapter3.html>.
150. Indeed, this Author has observed that the electric utility industry consistently receives high marks from consumers.
151. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552 (“In the absence of evidence that functional unbundling will not work, we are not prepared to adopt a more costly mechanism—corporate
unbundling [i.e. divestiture]—at this time.”).
152. See id.
153. Commissioner Herbert is the leading proponent inside the Commission. See Curt
L. Herbert, Jr., Moving the RTO Debate, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, 20.
154. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,396 (“[T]he preference of certain transmission
owners to sell or transfer their transmission assets to a for-profit transmission company in
lieu of handing over control to a non-profit ISO” has made it difficult to form voluntary,
multi-state ISOs.).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22.
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an incentive system that will result in an efficient and reliable delivery of transmission services.158 The for-profit transco, which is subject
to market forces, is expected by proponents to provide optimum
transmission services, in the same manner as the other for-profit
segments of the restructured industry are expected to optimize their
functions.159
2. Transco Will Continue Entrenched Market Power
Transmission organizations will be regional monopolies, and opponents of the transco model fear a single for-profit entity having
control over the transmission segment absent any natural forces to
prevent an abuse of this dominant position.160 This concern is exacerbated by the incomplete separation between transcos and affiliates
that permits the owners of transmission wires to unfairly advantage
their partners in other segments of the electric utility industry.161
Recent economic theory provides that even the power of a monopoly can be constrained if the monopoly’s market is “contestable.”162
Contestable markets are those dominated by a single firm, but where
“different firms may compete to be the single supplier.”163 Contestability, however, cannot bring market forces to bear on a monopoly in
the absence of potential entry by competitors.164 Entry by competitors
into a regional transmission area will be virtually impossible because
transcos “may draw narrow boundaries” that “achieve control over
key gateways of transmission commerce;” thus, the general conditions for contestability are not present.165 Transcos, as a result, will
be able to exercise their dominance in the market without any restraints. The very nature of the industry’s transmission segment and
the continuing commitment to and need for regulation under the
transco model leads to the conclusion that contestability will not
eliminate or even modify the exercise of monopoly power by transco
entities.166
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
See id.
See Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 6-7 (Rev. ed. 1988).
163. HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 242.
164. “[W]e have presented several examples in which some or all of the feasible price
vectors available to the monopolist are unsustainable in the absence of entry barriers.
However, we have also shown that while the pressure of potential entry can, in some circumstances, lead to instability in the market place, it is also a potent force extending the
benefits of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ to monopoly markets.” Id. at 217.
165. Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
166. See generally HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 242. In the context
of the transmission industry, the competition stage will have been completed, leaving the
transcos in the dominant position.
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The “weak invisible hand” of contestability may operate to constrain the exercise of monopolistic power when entry is possible, but
competition in the transmission segment through duplicate transmission wires is highly implausible.167 Still, competition among different grids might occur if transco entities take extreme advantage of
their market positions.168 As the FERC observed: “Many power sales
and transmission service contracts are written under the assumption
that the power delivered will flow on a particular contract path . . .
However, this assumption often does not accurately reflect what actually occurs . . . [as] some power may flow over the lines of adjoining
transmission systems.”169 The presence of parallel paths suggests
that alternative paths might actually exist. Nevertheless, the number of these paths is currently very limited, and a situation in which
competing transcos will offer such alternative paths to neighboring
transcos is unlikely.170 Availability of parallel paths will be virtually
eliminated by the shift to large RTOs in which only those customers
at the border of the region could switch to such a parallel path.171
Few purchasers of electricity are sophisticated enough to take advantage of these alternatives even if the alternatives were available;
thus, parallel paths will remain a hidden reliability alternative.
In sum, transcos will have total market power within their regions, and this market power will be enhanced as the generation and
distribution/marketing segments become more competitive in supplying transmission services.172 Purchasers of transmission services, either generators or distributors/consumers, will compete with each
other for transmission rights, and these purchasers will become more
vulnerable to transco operations as a result. Purchasers, dependent
on transcos for transmission services, will be unable to pursue
strategies to counterbalance the transcos’ market power.173
The exploitation of this market power makes it unlikely that the
transco model will enhance planning for future needs, which is the

167. The theory’s developers warn, for example: “[W]here entry costs are present, the
nonsustainability of natural monopoly means that a monopoly cannot find prices that permit it to earn rent equal to the entry costs and prevent wasteful entry simultaneously. But
that does not preclude the possibility that a natural monopoly can find prices that yield a
slightly lower rent and leave it invulnerable to entry. In such a case, despite the unsustainability, the threat of entry may still force the monopoly to behave better than it otherwise would have.” BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 162, at 221.
168. See Joshua Rokach, Transcos: How FERC Can Lend a Hand, ELECTRICITY J.,
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 68.
169. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,424.
170. See id.
171. See Rokach, supra note 167, at 68.
172. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
173. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 50 (“Ordinarily, a highly concentrated buyer market
reduces concerns about potential exercised of market power by sellers because buyers then
have strategies available that render exercise of market power more difficult.”).
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chief advantage touted by transco advocates.174 Commissioner Herbert, for example, asserted simply: “It is not clear that a non-profit
ISO will be able to perform the functions required to build new
transmission. In the end, if we [the for-profit sector] do not build it,
the electrons will not come.”175 Herbert’s proposition is inconsistent
with the traditional vision of monopolist behavior.176 Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission’s economists in a recent opposition to a proposed transco asserted: “As a general proposition, a for-profit Transco
may have incentives to perpetuate transmission congestion.”177 The
creation of congestion can result in a lower supply of transmission
capacity and higher profits for the transco.178
Accordingly, a transco can be expected to create scarcity in transmission capacity, rather than to expand it. Monopolists manage to
charge higher prices than firms in competitive industries by controlling the quantity of service or product supplied, rather than by simply raising prices.179 The transco model will not result in natural
pressures to meet growing demand, but will result in monopolistic efforts to take advantage of that growth by limiting transmission capacity in order to reap a greater profit. Perpetuation of this transco
monopoly would, therefore, artificially create both higher prices and
lower capacity, resulting in a net social welfare loss.
Similarly, the ISO model will not find inherent incentives for expansion of capacity, and special planning devices may be required to
achieve this goal. The ISO model, however, does not have a similar
profit incentive of the transco model to increase congestion and scarcity of transmission capacity. Recognizing this dilemma, at least subconsciously, the transco advocates offer traditional regulatory solutions such as capital investment incentives.180 Capital investment incentives are merely subsidies traditionally found in regulatory regimes. This incentive rate approach is simply regression to old174. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22.
175. Id. at 21.
176. See sources cited at supra note 15 (discussing monopolies).
177. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Energy Services, Inc. Doc. # EL 99-57-000 (May 27, 1999).
178. See id.
179. While a monopolist might be said to choose a price and hence accept a quantity,
most consistent with actual behavior is the view that the monopolist controls the quantity
in order to set the price. See HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 226. This behavior has been observed at least since Adam Smith’s first articulation of the free market
theory. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 147-48 (Modern Library 1937).
180. Compare the view of the two FERC Commissioners: Herbert, supra note 153, at
20 (“The case for incentive rates . . . is more compelling than ever.”); Massey, supra note
89, at 13, 17 (“First, and fundamental to this debate, is the question of whether it is necessary to dispense FERC candy to achieve our pro-competitive goals . . . [W]ill the candy
treat we give out be so great that they overshadow or even eliminate the consumer benefits
that could result from our grid regionalization policies?”) (emphasis added).
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fashioned regulatory thinking,181 and is antithetical to creating a
market-driven industry.182
The transco model will continue the old “regulatory compact”
whereby it, like its predecessor IOUs, will be expected by government
regulators to perform in the public interest in exchange for a dominant market position. The impact of such a massive consolidation of
market power in one for-profit entity is one of the many fears expressed by its opponents.183 Many transco critics fear that transcos,
as former IOUs, will use their dominant market power and ability to
create transmission congestion to benefit their “affiliates,” who are
typically their former IOU partners operating the generation and
distribution/marketing segments of the industry.184 The genesis of
this concern is the FERC’s choice of “functional unbundling” rather
than divestiture or “corporate unbundling.”185 As long as a continued
corporate identity exists among the major entities in what should be
truly competitive and distinct segments of the electricity market, discrimination and under-the-table deals among affiliates will be difficult to prevent.186 Any adoption of the transco model must mandate a
strict separation among the transco and other participants in the
electricity market.187
The FERC would allow a deviation from strict corporate segregation of one percent, which means that market participants could own
one percent of the transco, but potential transco owners can be expected to negotiate for higher allowable percentages of ownership.188
For example, securities laws allow a tolerance of five percent ownership before the SEC assumes control of the situation. Even a percentage of control as low as one percent raises potential problems,
however, because it grants market participants’ access to the
transco’s decisionmaking process.189

181. The famous Averch-Johnson analysis suggests that regulators must accurately set
rates at the true cost of capital or else regulated monopolies will overinvest. See Averch &
Johnson, supra note 32. But see BREYER & MACAVOY, supra note 93, at 108 (positing that
Averch-Johnson analysis “does not readily apply to electricity production.”). The AverchJohnson analysis seems unavoidable where regulators intentionally offer bonus rates for
capital expenditures.
182. In the natural gas industry, incentives paved the way for new pipelines. See
Robert Michaels & Arthur De Vany, Market-Based Rates for Interstate Pipelines: The Relevant Market and the Real Market, 16 ENERGY L.J. 299 (1995). In the natural gas industry,
the market precludes any seller from exercising market power. Several factors suggest that
such a preclusion does not exist in the electric utility industry. See Pierce, supra note 10, at
46.
183. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
184. See id.
185. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,415.
189. See id.
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Regardless, separation will be insufficient to offset the transco’s
market power. Unfortunately, discrimination is just one way for a
transco to exercise its market power. The idea that a firm can only
exercise market power once is axiomatic.190 A firm may use its market power to favor one part of its operation, say one in a competitive
industry, or a firm can reap the benefits directly. However, a firm
does not increase its market power by diffusing among its various
units. Discrimination, however, may be used to avoid detection of the
exercise of market power, and rate regulation may provide a strong
incentive to engage in such practices.191
Ultimately, policy must focus on the market power conferred on
transcos and not on how they might use it. The transcos will have
substantial market power. Since market forces do not exist to temper
transcos’ market power, regulation is the only alternative to the current system.
3. The Transco Model Will Preclude Independence from Regulation
The transco model assumes continued regulation of the transmission segment.192 The restructured electric utility industry would foster competition in the generation and distribution/marketing segments, but transmission rates would still require regulation because
each transco will be a regional monopoly.193 Arguably, the old partnership between utilities and regulators will be the best structure for
the transmission segment since this regime’s performance has been
at a minimum satisfactory to the majority of consumers.194 Still, the
old regulatory regime offends the current desire for independence
from government involvement in the industry.
Seeing their direct regulatory authority diminishing, regulators
advocate an industry model necessarily committed to traditional
regulation.195 Explaining regulators’ proposals through a public
choice model would be facile. As Commissioner Bailey observed: “It’s
hard for a regulator not to regulate.”196 Unsurprisingly, Commis190. See George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, in
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152 (Philip B. Kurkland ed.); Alan Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1997).
191. See FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BUSINESS
AND LABOR PRACTICES, 40-41 (1978).
192. See Vicky A. Bailey, Reassessing the Role of Regulators of Competitive Energy
Markets, or: Walking the Walk of Competition, 20 ENERGY L.J. 1, 10 (1999) (After expressing indifference between the transco and ISO models, Commissioner Bailey observed:
“Transco alternatives to not-for-profit ISOs should lack vertical integration and will continue to be regulated as public utilities by the FERC.”); see also Rokach, supra note 167, at
65 (concurring with Bailey’s observation).
193. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
194. As observed by this Author.
195. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64.
196. Bailey, supra note 191, at 1.
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sioner Bailey’s colleagues and their staff are drawn to the transco
approach that necessarily continues a core of regulatory authority.197
Giving its proponents the benefit of the doubt, the transco model
can honestly be seen as furthering a strong national commitment to
private ownership and control.198 In addition, the transco model appears less risky because it perpetuates government control over this
segment of the electric utility industry. Even though the transco will
be privately owned and operated, the model nevertheless requires
government regulation, which will disappoint advocates of pure deregulation.
B. ISO: Not-For-Profit Transmission Organizations
Until recently, a system built around various forms of grid manager entities has dominated the transmission design debate. A special type of ISO, known as independent system managers, has been
proposed and adopted.199 In this scheme, the ISO directs and manages transmission, but does not own or operate the facilities and is
thus unaffected by commercial pressure. The FERC continues to provide that “the principle of independence is the bedrock upon which
the ISO must be built.”200 The conditions for independence require a
separation of ISO decision-makers and employees from market participants.201 The advantage of the ISO model over the transco model
is that the ISO has a direct duty to function for the benefit of all
market participants and, ultimately, for the benefit of consumers.202
Because the ISO is not driven by a profit motive, the ISO will not require regulation to prevent an abuse of its dominant market position.
Separating the grid manager from economic forces also has drawbacks. The core drawback involves removal of the profit based incentive structure. The system cannot depend on market forces to ensure
that transmission wires deliver optimum service. Since ISOs will be
insulated from the direct operation of market forces, they will require
an entirely different set of incentives than the profit incentive driving transcos, as well as some form of direct monitoring by a regulatory entity.203 Thus, a design must be developed that will motivate
197. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64.
198. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64.
199. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 71.
200. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414 (quoting Atlantic City Elec. Co., et al., 77
FERC ¶¶ 61,148, 61,574 (1996)). The FERC noted an agreement from the Department of
Energy Reliability Task Force that concluded the transmission organization must be:
“truly independent of commercial interests so that their reliability actions are—and are
seen to be—unbiased and untainted.” Id. at 31,414 n.186.
201. See id. at 31,414.
202. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,596.
203. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22 (“Through performance based regulation,
FERC can provide incentives for maximum efficiency of operation . . . .”).
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ISO managers, in the absence of market forces, to optimize the use of
transmission facilities.
Designing such an incentive structure for ISO managers presents
the greatest challenge to implementing the ISO model. Market incentives are overwhelmingly preferable to the alternatives, which
have either failed or fallen short of expectations.204 Efficiency incentives may be the plausible alternative to market incentives and may
be the key to implementing a successful ISO.205
The choice between for-profit transcos and not-for-profit ISOs has
hinged on which alternative offers the best opportunity for future reliability of the transmission system. The ISO model is preferable to
the transco model because the for-profit transco can be expected to
resist expansion of its transmission capacity in an attempt to increase profitability,206 whereas the ISO will not resist expansion.207
Since ISO managers are not self-interested and will not inhibit expansion of transmission capacity, the key is to prescribe incentives
for ISO managers to promote future reliability.208 Designing incentives that encourage ISO managers to engage in the proper level of
expansion will be particularly challenging.
An additional complication is inherent in the ISO model’s dependency on ISO managers to devise incentives for private, for-profit
firms to invest in infrastructure and build for the future. ISOs are
essentially management organizations and must implement reliability plans by encouraging capital commitment, and unless an ISO has
the tools to encourage future investment, capacity will be endangered.209 In turn, if the ISO creates investment incentives allowing
private transmission companies to profit from investment, the ISO
must ensure that the investment incentives do not grant rights to the
private transmission companies that encourage the bottleneck phenomenon of decreasing transmission capacity to increase profits.
Thus, the provision of profit incentives to private investors by ISOs
could result in the same supply problems presented by the transco
model. ISOs appear to ensure reliability, but devising proper incentives that encourage investment remain problematic.

204. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50.
205. See id.
206. See supra Part III.A.2.
207. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 51.
208. See id. at 52.
209. Potential solutions to this task have been developed. See William Hogan, Contract
Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG. ECON. 211 (1992); James B. Bushnell
& Steven E. Stoft, Electric Grid Investment Under a Contract Network Regime, 10 J. REG
ECON. 61 (1996). The solutions might be summarized as involving credits for relieving congestions or some form of transmission congestion credit.
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V. GOVERNANCE OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION
Electricity is central to our modern society, and governance of the
electric utilities’ core segment, the transmission organization, is crucial to the effectiveness and public approval of a restructured industry. Well-designed governance mechanisms will guard against the
exploitation of transmission’s dominant position in the electric utility
industry. However, governance mechanisms have more than a disciplinary role. Because electricity is so pervasive in modern society,
public involvement in transmission operations is imperative for public satisfaction with the restructured industry. Yet neither the fear of
transmission’s dominant market position, nor the need for broad participation can be allowed to encumber the transmission organizations’ ability to deliver adequate electric service. The design of governance structures will require a careful balance between openness
of process and necessary restraints on the one hand, and efficient
management and operational freedom on the other.
A. Governance Mechanisms
Design of the governance mechanisms must reflect the fundamental role electricity plays in everyone’s life in the United States. In
some way, individual interests must be represented in the transmission organization’s decisionmaking process, but individual interests
cannot be represented in a homogeneous manner. Finding the proper
vehicle for representing a wide spectrum of interests must be the
overarching goal of governance design. Governance of the transmission organization will, of course, be affected by the choice between
the transco and ISO models. The choice might involve both a practical and a normative judgment as to whether control, but not necessarily ownership, of the transmission facilities should be vested in
“shareholders” or “stakeholders.”210
A transco will primarily be a reconfiguration of the traditional Investor Owned Utility (IOU), and control will remain in the hands of
the shareholders, owners or investors.211 Managers in a transco will
have a duty to maximize profits for the shareholders. In contrast, the
ISO is an independent organization with a duty to all of its stakeholders. The governing process of the ISO must reflect the large and
diverse group that is affected by the ISO’s actions. Given the dominant position of the transmission segment, a transco governance

210. The FERC uses the term “stakeholder” interchangeably with “market participant,” to mean any entity that buys or sells electricity who might be affected by the RTO’s
actions. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414 n.187. In this article, the term “stakeholder” is used to include all those who have a stake in the proper operation of the electric
utility industry, including ultimate consumers.
211. See supra Part III.A.
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structure should likewise include more open and broad participation
than the archetypical corporate governance structure. Yet, even with
openness and participation, the transco model will require pervasive
external monitoring.212
Whereas adoption of the transco model commits to the tradition of
self-interested management and government oversight, the ISO
model requires careful innovation in governance design. Because
public interest decision-making is expected in the ISO model, conflicts of interest are a much greater concern.213 Self-interested decisions will be expected and appropriately monitored in the transco
model, but the ISO will be expected to act for the greater good of the
entire system and, due to the lack of monitoring, will present many
more opportunities for clandestine self-dealing.214
Division of power is the dominant strategy for dealing with conflicts of interests and abuses by managers. For example, the PJM regional transmission organization has a “board of managers” that
governs two component sections: a “members committee” and the
“Office of the Interconnection.”215 In a similar commitment to divided
power, the FERC envisions a governing board of “non-stakeholders,”
which the FERC terms “non-market participants.”216 The FERC provides that “[t]he non-stakeholder board would be the ultimate decision making authority, though it could choose to delegate decisions to
its staff or committees of stakeholders.”217 By dividing power and
forcing transparency of decisionmaking, self-interested decisions
should be extremely difficult.
Expressing concern that the non-stakeholder board fails to grasp
the practical problems faced by market participants, the FERC requested comments on whether stakeholders should be represented on
that governing board. 218 The FERC’s non-stakeholder category does
not encompass the diversity of interests that must be addressed in
any electric utility governance structure.219 No other industry has
such a broad array of discrete interests as does the electric utility industry, which includes market participants, non-market participants, and various government institutions. Each of these groups is
comprised of subgroups with distinct interests and goals.220 These
212. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16.
213. See Michaels, supra note 69, at 234.
214. See id.
215. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of the
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., § 7.7(i)-(xv), 14-16 (1997) (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http://www.pjm.com/index.html>.
216. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,415.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 51 (discussing large stakeholder boards as “structurally flawed”).
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subgroups are only facially united by the overarching goal of having
the industry function efficiently.
Thus, one readily apparent design defect is the forced compilation
of too many groups into one governing body. The ISO design should
examine European government operations that often include external committees with real power. The European Union’s (EU’s) organic laws establish, for example, two representative committees, a
committee representing “various categories of economic and social activity,” and a committee representing “regional and local bodies.”221
These committees “must be consulted” by the government institutions,222 and although the law only requires consultation, these committees do have practical power. The EU’s governing bodies also
delegate “legislative”223 authority to “management committees.”224
Some of these committees are consultative only, but some are “regulatory committees,” who have real formal power. Any measure issued
by these governing bodies cannot take effect until it receives a favorable opinion from the management committees.
Instead of attempting to provide representation for these numerous groups of diverse interests on one or two governing boards, ISO
governance should formally disperse power among committees consisting of various categories of interests.225 A consumer committee,
for example, will present a united consumer perspective226 that any
governing body must consider. Certain specialized committees could
have special powers of approval for decisions involving the committees’ areas of expertise. A pure delegation of authority and power to
specialized committees might be dangerous, while an open process of
consultation with specialized committees could provide effective representation of all stakeholders.227
Still, one governing body must have final decisionmaking authority, and a broad representation of interests on that body is crucial.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) alleviated a similar representation problem by creating a board of directors consisting of equal

221. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, arts. 193, 198a, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1. C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
222. See id. art. 198.
223. See id. art. 198c.
224. See GEORGE A. BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 60-63 (1993).
225. This opinion is informed by personal experience with student representation in
law school governance. Over many years, this Author has observed that students are better represented by their own committees, which report to a faculty committee, rather than
by representation on the faculty committee in which they are generally overwhelmed or coopted.
226. Consumers are themselves a diverse group, including big industrials, smaller
businesses, residentials, and disadvantaged consumers.
227. The FERC noted problems with delegation at least to market participant committees. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,415 n.190.
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numbers of public and industry directors. The NYSE ‘s constitution
designates which groups the public directors should represent.228 A
similar structure may be effective in the electric utility industry. A
separate nominating committee that generally reflects the representation on the board nominates the NYSE board members. This separate nominating committee, while not totally insulating the process
from manipulation, at least opens the process to public scrutiny.
B. Regulatory Aspects of Transmission Organizations
The Department of Justice aptly characterized the ISO as a selfregulatory organization (SRO) that is comparable to a stock exchange.229 The extensive experience of the securities industry SROs,
particularly the NYSE and the National Association of Stock Dealers
(NASD), should provide some insight into private regulatory operations. The SRO regulatory strategy is to allow the industry to police
itself. The government agency’s role is to monitor the SRO.230 The
SROs have the advantage of understanding the industry and balancing effective regulation with its practical needs. The SROs’ commitment to effective regulation is ensured by the threat that governmental entities will resume regulation if the SROs’ performance proves
inadequate. The ISO model will allow the electric utility industry to
employ the SRO strategy. The ISO would establish policies, set standards, conduct compliance operations, and provide enforcement dispute resolution processes.231 The FERC would monitor the ISOs to
ensure that they fairly and effectively perform their regulatory responsibilities.232
In contrast, the transco choice requires direct regulation because
its governing body will have a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to
maximize its profit.233 That duty constrains the transco manager’s
power to make public interest motivated decisions. Thus to ensure
social welfare, regulators must be directly involved in overseeing
transco management decisions rather than assuming a monitoring
role as prescribed under the ISO model.234 Still, the transco might be
designed to be more sensitive to interests other than those of its
shareholders. An alternative, for example, might be to delegate special legislative authority with the directive to include certain public
interest considerations in transco decisionmaking. While the transco
228. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES ¶ 1152 (1998).
229. See Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Comments in Response to the FERC
NOPR (1995).
230. In the context of securities, the monitoring government agencies are the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Future Trading Commission.
231. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,595-97.
232. See id.
233. See Michaels, supra note 69, at 233.
234. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22.
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manager’s business judgment might undervalue public interest considerations, transcos will be forced to justify choices on public interest grounds and will be criticized for choices inimical to that interest.235 To enforce this policy, legislation might even allow some type
of formal utlra vires challenge to specifically designated transco
management decisions.
C. Process for Policy-Making in Transmission Organizations
In addition to the independence of the ultimate decisionmaking
authority, the process of formulating transmission organization policy and setting standards must be open and must facilitate participation by interested parties. As with government agencies, transmission organizations will exercise quasi-legislative authority through
its promulgation of rules.236 Federal and state agencies are required
to use “notice and comment” procedures to promulgate rules with
binding effect.237 The rulemaking process has four general requirements: notice, an opportunity for comments, a statement justifying
the rule, and publication.238 The notice and comment procedures create an extremely effective method for openness, participation, and information gathering.239
However, the shift to a non-governmental entity, such as an ISO,
may cause abandonment of the standard procedure for governmental
rulemaking. The NYSE’s constitution delegates rulemaking authority to its board, but does not mandate a participatory process.240 Existing ISOs also do not require such procedures.241 The FERC’s own

235. See id. (discussing transcos promotion of reliability, efficiency, coordination, and
investment).
236. Delegations to private entities have been accepted, but are not without critics. See
Railway Labor Executive’s Ass’n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 590 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the Secretary of Transportation could delegate drug testing authority to the railroads), rev’d on other grounds, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). For instance, the Secretary of Agriculture may issue marketing orders governing the amount of a commodity that growers can
produce and market. The Secretary generally offers to amend a marketing order to include
any terms favored by some super-majority, often 75%, of the growers. In Sequoia Orange
Co. v. Yeutter, 985 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1993), the court decided that the Secretary’s practice
was not an unconstitutional delegation of power to private persons. Neil Kinkopf considered the effect of separation of powers on congressional delegation to nonfederal authorities. See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 355 (1998) (“[T]he same general separation of powers principles applies to all nonfederal actors; there is not a peculiar principle that applies to states as opposed to private parties . . .”).
237. See 1 KOCH, supra note 128, §§ 4.32 & 4.33 (2d. ed. 1997).
238. See id. §§ 4.32, 4.33, 4.45, & 4.46.
239. See id. §§ 4.32 & 4.33.
240. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., supra note 227, at ¶ 1351.
241. But see Bylaws of the California Independent System Operator Corporation and
the California ISO Open Meeting Policy adopted April 23, 1998 (visited June 29, 1999)
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rules should require public access to the rulemaking processes of
transmission organizations. The FERC should employ its own experience with notice and comment requirements to provide guidance
to transmission organizations on developing open processes.
The key to the fairness and effectiveness of informal rulemaking
is the adequacy of notice. The electric utility industry has established
a sophisticated electronic network system that could be used to provide effective electronic notice. The Open Access Same-time Information System (OASIS) will provide interested parties with real notice,
as opposed to the publication of notice in the federal register.242 Using
only electronic notice, however, may be insufficient because the general public will not be monitoring systems such as OASIS.
Electronic technology may also enhance participation in the comment process. One study shows that agencies that offer the opportunity to comment in electronic form receive far greater numbers of
comments.243 Moreover, a process whereby comments are submitted
in electronic form enables use of computerized organization and
search capabilities. Electronic capacity and storage, therefore, will
mitigate one of the most difficult problems in rulemaking: the management of a lengthy and complex record.244
Transmission organizations should also employ negotiated rulemaking as it is applied in federal administrative law. Negotiated
rulemaking facilitates the development of rules by interested parties.245 Ultimately, the negotiated rule will still be presented for public comment so that those excluded from the negotiation will have an
opportunity to contribute.246 ISOs, even more than government agencies, should use negotiation to effectively incorporate all the key interests in setting policy and standards with a minimum of formal
procedures.
Negotiated rulemaking is an established element in federal administrative law.247 When interested people are brought together and
develop a rule, the process is more efficient, effective, and sensitive to

<http://www.caiso.com/pubinfo/corpdoc/> (describing a procedure similar to notice and
comment rulemaking).
242. See Order 889, supra note 3, established OASIS, which provides transmission users with information about transmission capacity and prices. Since it will, by necessity, be
the core information source for participants, it might well be adapted to operational communications, including requests for comments.
243. See Peter Strauss, “The Challenges of Globally Accessible Process,” George Berman, Matthias Hegeden, & Peter Lindseth, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on file with authors).
244. See 1 KOCH, supra note 128, § 4.44.
245. See id. § 4.36.
246. See id.
247. Between 1983 and 1996, approximately 36 final rules have been negotiated by 17
agencies. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1274 (1997).
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all interests. Many commentators have promoted negotiated rulemaking as a cure for many of the problems with government rulemaking.248 Though initially viewed merely as an experiment to promote negotiated rulemaking, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of
1990249 has encouraged use of the process by many federal agencies.
The experience of these agencies with negotiated rulemaking may
assist in the development of such processes by transmission organizations.250
Many theoretical and practical problems with negotiated rules exist such as which parties to include in the negotiations. This and
other problems raise general questions about negotiated rulemaking,251 but by anticipating these possible pitfalls, they can be avoided
while developing a negotiation process for transmission organizations. The nature of the transmission organization itself will greatly
affect the process. It will not so much participate as a party, as a
government agency does in negotiated rulemaking, but more as a
mediator attempting to work out an agreement among the stakeholders. Thus, negotiation processes should be one of the alternative
procedures available in transmission organization policymaking and
standard setting.
Government regulators will monitor policymaking by transmission organizations, as they do with other SROs, but courts must also
248. See Conference, Harvard Electricity Policy Group: Regulatory Decisionmaking Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 789, 875 (1995) (Professor Michael Asimow stating: “[Negotiated rulemaking] is the policymaking idea of the 21st Century.”); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 112 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1717 (1986); DAVID M.
PRITZKER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, & DEBORAH S. DALTON,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990). An
Administrative Conference study strongly urged the use of negotiated rules in many selected situations. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, Recommendation No. 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg.
30708 (1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. part 305, but relevant of chapter 1 C.F.R., ch. III, entirely removed in 1996). An executive study also recommended negotiated rulemaking. See
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS: ACCOMPANYING
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 30 (1993); Executive Order 12866, § 6
(a), 3 C.F.R. 1993 Comp. 638, 644. Congress ultimately agreed and passed the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570.
249. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994). The act empowers the head of an agency to create
a rulemaking committee to negotiate a rule if the agency head determines that such a procedure would be “in the public interest.” See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a). The agency may use a “convenor” to help identify those who might serve on a rulemaking committee and to frame the
issues for negotiation, see 5 U.S.C. § 563(b), and a “facilitator” chairs the meetings, see 5
U.S.C. § 566(d). The agency may use the committee report as the basis for a proposed rule,
following ordinary notice and comment procedures. In general, the Act establishes a “consultative process in advance of the more formal arms’ length procedure of notice and comment rulemaking.” USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 1996).
250. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, BUILDING CONSENSUS
IN AGENCY RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTING THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT (1995).
251. See 1 KOCH, supra note 128, § 4.36.

606

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:569

have a role. Appropriately defined judicial review will contribute to
the policy dialogue and add political legitimacy to the decisions of the
transmission organization.252 Such legitimacy is imperative for an industry that affects every citizen. The key is to carefully define a judicial role in transmission organization policymaking that takes advantage of its monitoring and legitimizing functions while still enabling the process to benefit from the expertise and efficiencies of
transmission organization governance.253 Accordingly, the judicial
presence should be well defined and minimal.254 Unless experience
dictates otherwise, judicial review should be confined to decisions
made by government monitors of transmission organization policymaking.
VI. INDIVIDUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The market approach to the electric utility industry will raise a
variety of individual disputes that were not problematic under the
private management and regulatory regime. Because the industry
was vertically integrated, most decisions were handled as part of internal management. As the industry becomes more functionally and
structurally unbundled, categories of these management decisions
become private disputes. Private, governmental, or judicial dispute
resolution, therefore, will become a key factor in both the costeffectiveness and the appearance of fairness of the restructured industry. The FERC should take a leadership role in the formulation
and implementation of dispute resolution procedures for transmission organizations and the industry.
A. The Need for Individual Dispute Resolution
Since these disputes are private, they might be resolved within
the ordinary judicial process; however, the creation of a massive new
body of litigation could be avoided through implementation of alternative dispute resolution processes (ADR). In Order 888’s eleven
principles, the FERC recommends including ADR procedures in all
transmission organization design.255 The appropriateness of ADR in a
transmission organization is affected by the choice between for-profit
and not-for-profit entities. The transcos will be active participants
with a clear interest in the resolution of many disputes, and the
252. See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 826
(1994) (noting that the limited review authorized by “[t]he hard look doctrine, properly applied, contributes to the political conversation between governmental branches, enhances
deliberative democratic decisionmaking and contributes to legitimacy”).
253. See id. at 823-24.
254. See id. at 823-25.
255. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,597.
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transcos will often be one of the parties in the disputes. Thus, avoiding conflicts of interest militates against transcos managing the dispute resolution process. ISOs, on the other hand, are by definition
independent third parties and could appropriately operate a dispute
resolution process for the benefit of the market participants. Alleged
misconduct by the ISO itself will in any event be presented to regulatory authorities or to the judiciary.
Government regulatory authorities could also provide the ADR
process as an alternative or supplement to private processes. As the
system moves inexorably towards regional transmission organizations, the FERC becomes the only feasible government institution to
provide ADR services. A FERC administered ADR service would be
particularly appropriate for transcos. The legitimacy of the FERC
providing the mechanism for resolving private disputes arising directly from electricity transmission is unquestionable. In Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,256 the U.S. Supreme Court
even allowed the agency’s dispute resolution service to resolve “a
narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the [agency’s]
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function.”257 Nonetheless,
the FERC’s observation is accurate that “[i]t is generally more efficient for these organizations to resolve many disputes internally
rather than bringing every dispute to the Commission.”258
The transmission organization could rely on existing arbitration
and mediation mechanisms.259 Existing ISO arrangements incorporate arbitration and mediation devices.260 Arbitration can be successful for the transco, as well as for the ISO model. Contracts made between either variety of transmission organization and other market
participants should require that disputes be taken to an independent
dispute resolution authority. Thus, ADR will be appropriate even
when the transco itself is a party to the dispute. Compulsory arbitration has been consistently upheld.261 The Supreme Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,262 held that an individual employee
who had signed an arbitration agreement as part of his application
for registration with the NYSE was bound to arbitrate.263 The Court

256. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
257. Id. at 854.
258. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,410.
259. See Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994); Administrative Procedure Technical
Amendments Act of 1991, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994).
260. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, § 12.3
(visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.pjm.com/index.html>.
261. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-39 (1987).
262. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
263. See id. at 26.
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rejected the argument that arbitration is procedurally and substantively inadequate.264
The FERC, nonetheless, should adhere to its original principle
that “[a]n ISO should establish an ADR process to resolve disputes in
the first instance.”265 Existing ISOs or their equivalent have established their own dispute resolution processes. For example, the bylaws of the California ISO require that “to the extent practicable,
reasonable and permitted by law,” dispute resolution procedures
should be included in each contract.266 The PJM regional transmission organization has a fairly elaborate process and has established
an Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee to deal with conflicts.267
Procedures for electric utility ADR should be uniquely designed to
handle disputes replete with a wide range of expert opinions regarding engineering, finance, and industry specific practices.268 ADR in
the United States, unlike AFR in other countries, employs generalist
judges and a single procedural form. However, disputes in the electric utility industry will require specialist decisionmakers and tailored processes.269 The rejection of regulation does not mean that one
should ignore the consistent finding of administrative law that traditional judicial practice must be modified under many administrative
conditions.
B. FERC’s Contribution to Transmission Organization ADR
1. FERC Must Assure Procedural Adequacy
The best dispute resolution option is probably the one provided by
an independent transmission organization. Still, the FERC has ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the procedures will be adequate.270 Courts are not inclined to second-guess private procedural
design, but the FERC’s scrutiny should be thorough.

5.

264. See id. at 27-32.
265. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,597.
266. California Electricity Oversight Board decision 97-01-01, Appendix A, Article IV, §

267. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee (visited April 1, 2000), <http//www.pjm.com/index.html>.
268. To this end, the PJM Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee has the power to
craft procedures. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM Revised Operating Agreement of
September 3, 1999, Schedule 5, § 5.5(vii) (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http://www.pjm.com/index.html>.
269. See Stanley W. Hulett, Restructuring the Electrical Utility Industry, 53 DISP.
RESOL. J. 26, 27 (1998).
270. In 1998, Congress sought to improve ADR generally by enacting the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998).
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Procedural due process might apply to transmission organization
adjudications. First, these adjudications are so intertwined with government authorization that they may constitute “state action.”271
Since Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,272 a SRO’s procedures have
been subject to review, if not under due process, then under some
fundamental notion of fairness.273 But procedural due process has
long been understood as a flexible concept amendable to practical
considerations.274
Because reasonable ADR designs will be accepted when justified
by the circumstances, the FERC should actively participate in developing procedural ADR designs. The experience from both due process
jurisprudence and administrative law is vast and should be carefully
examined in developing designs tailored to the various adjudicative
tasks arising from the restructured electric utility industry. Moreover, actual experience with such dispute resolution is growing
within the industry and is well developed in other SRO contexts.
The RTO NOPR seeks comment on the types of issues that would
be appropriate for ISO dispute resolution.275 The FERC should follow
this line of inquiry further, take steps to develop categories of disputes that will arise in the restructured electric utility industry, and
encourage uniform procedures tailored to each category. For example, electricity operations will generate disputes about the failure to
perform, compensation for coverage of such failures by the transmission organization, unfair practices, disciplinary actions against certain market participants, claims of violation of open access principles, and implementation of curtailment priorities. Each of these issues should generate carefully crafted procedures for uniform use in
all the transmission regions. The FERC should add its own specialized experience in electricity adjudications to the formation of procedural ADR designs.
The FERC should lead the search for innovative procedural ADR
approaches. Many of the disputes will demand very expeditious and
cost-conscious processes. The FERC and its practitioners have considerable experience with written hearings and, especially in disputes involving expert considerations, the FERC should apply its ex271. A private entity may have a sufficient relationship with the state to convert action
by its employees into state action. See Milo v. Cushing Mun. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194, 1196
(10th Cir. 1988). However, the fact that a private entity is highly regulated by the federal
government does not suffice to bring it within the meaning of “state action.” See Jesinger v.
Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1994).
272. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
273. See id. at 364 (“Congress in effecting a scheme of self-regulation designed to insure fair dealing cannot be thought to have sanctioned and protected self-regulative activity when carried out in a fundamentally unfair manner.”).
274. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local, 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
275. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,410.
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perience to procedural ADR design.276 Off-site technology should also
be examined since the growing comfort with technology has led to the
acceptance of telephone hearings or interactive video hearings. In the
busy world of the restructured electric utility industry, such alternatives to face-to-face confrontation may be preferable to the parties involved in disputes.
2. FERC Should Promote a Specialized Presiding Official Pool
The FERC should facilitate the development of a national pool of
electricity adjudicators. Judge Friendly, in his seminal work on administrative procedures, observed that an impartial decisionmaker is
the most essential element to fair adjudications.277 The FERC should
focus on ensuring the availability of competent, impartial, and expert
adjudicators.
Central panels comprised of administrative presiding officials
have been created in nearly half of the states.278 The central panel is
administrated by an independent agency that provides presiding officials to agencies. The presiding officials have the advantage of independence from the agencies and thereby create both the appearance
and the reality of impartiality. This independence from the parties,
even from the agency, also allows for the management of presiding
officials without compromising their impartiality.
The FERC should also facilitate the establishment of an independent national panel of judges, specializing in electricity issues, to
whom transmission organizations may request hearing of their disputes. As with states’ central panels of administrative officials, this
pool of specialized ‘electricity’ judges will be independent of the
transmission organizations and market participants. Indeed, if the
transco model is adopted, this appearance of independence will be
crucial. At present, the default approach seems to be reliance on a
general pool of arbitrators who lack specialized knowledge of the
electric utility industry. While the default approach might ensure independence, it cannot ensure the type of expertise necessary to adjudicate many of the disputes that will develop in the restructured
electric utility industry. A panel of judges specializing in electricity
issues could ensure expertise by imposing qualifying standards and
continuing education.
This national panel of judges should be independent of the FERC.
While the FERC should take the necessary steps to establish an electricity panel, the FERC should then allow the panel to operate as an

276. See Hulett, supra note 268, at 26.
277. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279
(1975).
278. See 2 KOCH, supra note 128, § 5.24(7).
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independent private organization. The federal government could
fund and establish standards for the panel. Alternatively, the panel
could also easily be funded from fees assessed to the transmission organizations, and a panel governing board could establish its own
management and performance standards.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. McClure279 found that a
government-sponsored system employing private adjudicators did
not violate due process.280 In this case involving reimbursement under Medicare,281 the claimant charged that presiding officials were
not impartial because the insurance companies had hired them.282 In
the absence of direct evidence showing partiality, the Court refused
to infer bias from the fact that private judges were technically employees of the insurance companies.283 Further, the Court rejected the
argument that government adjudication was necessary for due process.284 Thus, a panel of electricity judges would be a legitimate solution to the need for independent, expert presiding officials.285
C. Review of Law and Policy in an Electricity
Dispute Resolution System
The independence of dispute resolutions, whether by private arbitration or special panels, might threaten presiding officers’ faithfulness to both the law and transmission organization policy in individual application. Some review of individual decisions, therefore, must
be available. A key to successful performance of the dispute resolution process within the larger system will depend on a clear articulation of review responsibilities. Three review authorities will operate
in the system: transmission organization governing body review,
government agency review, and judicial review.
1. Administrative Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions
As discussed above, the transmission organizations will generate
a body of policy decisions and standards. The independent operation
of a dispute resolution process may threaten the uniform application

279. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
280. See id. at 200; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
571 (1985) (concluding that Article III of the Constitution does not prohibit “[c]ongress
from selecting binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for
resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA’s [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act] pesticide registration scheme”).
281. See 456 U.S. at 189-90.
282. See id. at 192-93.
283. See id. at 195.
284. See id. at 198.
285. Delegation of adjudicatory authority to a private entity is constitutional. See Kinkopf, supra note 234, at 396.
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of these policies.286 In addition, disappointed parties in the dispute
resolution process will want a second review.
Existing transmission organizations’ arrangements call for administrative review by the FERC or relevant state authorities.287 Appeal
to these government authorities can certainly ensure adherence to
tariffs and other agreements between the transmission organizations
and the government authorities. The government authorities could
also develop administrative review processes that would check unfairness or discrimination.
However, the transmission organization itself might provide such
review.288 The transmission organization can best determine faithful
adherence to its policies and standards. Moreover, internal selfcorrection will further eliminate the need for government involvement in the transmission process. As the experience in government
agencies indicates, dealing with individual cases will sharpen the
governing authorities’ policymaking and standard setting.
2. Judicial Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions
The court’s role in electricity dispute resolutions must be carefully
circumscribed. The judicial process will often be inappropriate for the
resolution of these disputes. Yet judicial involvement cannot be totally precluded; the courts must ensure compliance with the laws.
Currently, the law accommodates a limited judicial role in dispute
resolutions. Judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions is limited to ensuring that those decisions comport with the law and documents authorizing the arbitration.289 Generally, courts do not review the merits of an arbitration award.290
The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.291 determined that in establishing an arbitration process administered by a federal agency, Congress could severely limit
judicial review.292 Judicial review was available in that program only
for “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.”293 The Court concluded that the arbitration scheme did not contravene Article III of
the Constitution.294 Even though manufacturers’ claims under the
286. See 2 KOCH, supra note 128, § 5.28.
287. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM Revised Operating Agreement of September
3, 1999, Schedule 5, § 4.14 (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.pjm.com/index.html>; California ISO Tariff, § 13.4.3.2 (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.caiso.com/pubinfo/tariffs/>.
288. Disciplinary adjudications of the NYSE may be reviewed by its board of directors.
See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.: CONSTITUTION AND RULES, § 1406 (1998).
289. See Kar Nut Prods. Co. v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters Local 337, 798 F. Supp. 1303,
1306 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
290. See Marion Mfg. Co. v. Long, 588 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1978).
291. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
292. See id. at 571.
293. Id. at 573-74.
294. See id. at 589.
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act had some aspects
of “private rights” for which judicial protection is required, the Court
concluded that these issues were not “purely” private rights and
hence Congress could provide for arbitration.295 Likewise, the issues
in electricity dispute resolution will not be purely private rights and,
hence, limits on judicial review should be found acceptable.
Thus, judicial review can be limited in any transmission organization dispute resolution regime either by agreement or delegation. The
key is properly defining those limits. In general, judicial review
should be limited to questions of law and assertion of jurisdiction by
the transmission organization’s ADR authority.
VII. CONCLUSION
Design of the electricity transmission organization is, in fact, the
keystone of the restructuring process. Failure here will handicap the
restructured industry for the foreseeable future. Great care is called
for in acceptance of proposed designs, in the regulation now before
the FERC, and future legislative actions.
Hard choices will be made. Surely, the transmission organizations
must be regional, and the FERC should mandate that option. The
trend towards independent not-for-profit operators, the ISO model,
should be continued. The for-profit, transco model, raises a real specter of unbridled market power, which, at best, will mean the perpetuation of the regulatory regime. Regardless of the outcome of
these two basic choices, particular care must be taken in designing
the internal policymaking, standard setting, and dispute resolution
processes. Participants in that design, many of whom are not accustomed to confronting such issues, must ensure that the internal decisionmaking process fits the special needs of this restructured industry.

295. See id.

